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## RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

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ATTORNEY AND CLIENT—APPLICATION FOR LICENSE—POWER OF COURT.—Application for a license to practice law was made to the Supreme Court of Appeals in compliance with the following statute: "Any person desiring to obtain a license to practice law must appear before the county court of the county \*\*\* and prove to the satisfaction of such court that he is a person of good moral character \*\*\*; and upon such proof being made, the court shall make and enter an order on its record accordingly \*\*\* And the Supreme Court of Appeals may upon the production of a duly certified order, hereinbefore mentioned, etc., \*\*\* grant such applicant a license to practice law" in the courts of the state. Code 1906, § 1, c. 119. The Bar Association of Charleston opposed the granting of the license on the ground that the applicant was not a person of good moral character. *Held*, (POFFENBARGER and BRANNON, JJ., dissenting), that the county court's finding as to "good moral character" is not conclusive but only *prima facie* evidence thereof, and that the license be refused. *In re Application for License to Practice Law* (1910),—W. Va. —, 67 S. E. 597.

The theory underlying the opinion of the majority is that the power to prescribe rules for the admission to the practice of the law is inherently vested in the courts. *In re Day*, 181 Ill. 73, 50 L. R. A. 519. The dissenting opinion, drawing a sharp distinction between a license to practice law and admission to or membership in the bar of a court, concludes that the licensing of attorneys or the members of any other profession "belongs to the police power of the state, exercised by the legislature." *Re Applicants*, 143 N. Car. 1, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 288; *In re Cooper*, 22 N. Y. 67; *Ex parte Yale*, 24 Cal. 242. See also *In re Branch*, 70 N. J. L. 537; *In re Goodell*, 39 Wis. 232, 20 Am. Rep. 42; *In re Goodell*, 48 Wis. 693; *In re Leach*, 134 Ind. 665; *In re Splane*, 123 Pa. St. 527. Apart from the mooted question of the court's power over admission to the practice of the law, its power over the attorney as an officer of the court is complete. "The latter may exercise its summary jurisdiction over him to the extent of depriving him of his office." This power to strike from the rolls is inherent in the court itself. WEEKS, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW, § 80. The court, however, must exercise its power with a sound and just judicial discretion, whereby the rights and independence of the bar may be as scrupulously guarded and maintained by the court, as the rights and dignity of the court itself." *In re Secombe*, 19 How. 9 (60 U. S. 9), 15 L. Ed., 565. The statutory grounds for the disbarment of an attorney-at-law are not exclusive. *In re Smith*, 73 Kan. 743, 748; *Bar Ass'n. v. Greenwood*, 168 Mass. 169, 183.

BILLS AND NOTES—ACCOMMODATION MAKER—EVIDENCE EXCLUDED TO CHANGE LIABILITY.—Plaintiff brings suit on a note executed by defendant as an accommodation maker. The note was not paid at maturity, and later the payee went into bankruptcy, and its property came into possession of plaintiff who